Discretionary Functions—The Planning-Operational Dichotomy Revisited by anon,
Washington Law Review 
Volume 41 Number 2 
4-1-1966 
Discretionary Functions—The Planning-Operational Dichotomy 
Revisited 
anon 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr 
 Part of the Torts Commons 
Recommended Citation 
anon, Recent Developments, Discretionary Functions—The Planning-Operational Dichotomy Revisited, 41 
Wash. L. Rev. 340 (1966). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr/vol41/iss2/8 
This Recent Developments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law 
Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington Law Review by an authorized editor of UW Law 
Digital Commons. For more information, please contact cnyberg@uw.edu. 
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
DISCRETIONARY FUNCTIONS-THE PLANNING-
OPERATIONAL DICHOTOMY REVISITED
Federal officials, supervising a high-priority contract to dredge and
improve a navigable river, approved a decision to deposit dredged spoil
on a vacant lot situated near plaintiff's building. An exhaustive search
by a naval officer revealed no other feasible land site immediately
available. Wind carried gases emanating from the spoil to plaintiff's
buildings, allegedly reacting upon the exterior surfaces to cause severe
damage. Plaintiff brought an action under the Federal Tort Claims
Act' against the United States and its contractor, alleging negligence in
the decision to place the spoil on the land, rather than dump it at sea,
and in failing to take precautions against the escaping gas. The United
States moved for summary judgment, claiming immunity under the
"discretionary functions" exception2 within the act. The court granted
the motion.' Held: A determination to dump spoil on land, rather than
carry it out to sea, and not to take precautions against escaping fumes,
was a "planning level" decision which falls within the discretionary
function immunity of the Federal Tort Claims Act, and prevents re-
covery for damage to a nearby building resulting from the escaping
fumes. Dolphin Gardens, Inc. v. United States, 243 F. Supp. 824
(D. Conn. 1965).
Recognizing that nearly all human activity requires some type of
"discretion," the United States Supreme Court has interpreted the
discretionary functions immunity of the Federal Tort Claims Act as
exculpating only government decisions made at the "planning level"
of government.4 Negligent decisions at the "operational level" do not
128 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671-78, 2680 (1964).228 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1964):
Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the Government,
exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation, whether or not
such statute or regulation be valid, or based upon the exercise or performance
or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part
of a federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the discre-
tion involved be abused.
3 The contractor's motion for summary judgment was also granted. Since the
government plans did not provide for a safeguard against the escape of fumes, the
contractor could not be held liable for this omission. Dolphin Gardens, Inc. v. United
States, 243 F. Supp. 824, 827 (D. Conn. 1965).
4 Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953). In a 4-3 decision the Court held
the Government not liable for the multi-million dollar claims arising out of the
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fall within the exception.' The principal case is an example of the
problems and pitfalls6 in determining where the "planning level" ends
and the "operational level" begins.
The court in the principal case, noting that the planning-operational
distinction "has not been clearly drawn," stated that the initial decision
to dredge the channel was clearly within the discretionary function
immunity. Attempting to draw a line between the planning and opera-
tional levels, the court stated that "affirmative decisions to act or not
to act rather than the negligent performance of a course of action
already decided upon,"' are decisions at the planning level, falling
within the discretionary function exception. Without discussing recent
cases holding that planning-level discretion ends with the initial govern-
mental decision to act,8 the court in Dolphin Gardens concluded that
the decision to dump the spoil on land without taking precautions
against escaping fumes, although subsequent to the initial decision to
dredge the river, was "far removed from the operational level and ...
well within the scope of 'discretionary functions'."9
Texas City disaster. The claims resulted from an explosion of ammonium nitrate
fertilizer which was being loaded on ships in the Texas City harbor for shipment to
Europe as part of the Government re-development program after World War II.
The lower court found negligence in the manufacturing process. The Supreme Court
disposed of this finding by saying:
The acts found to have been negligent were thus performed under the direction
of a plan developed at a high level under a direct delegation of plan-making
authority from the apex of the Executive Department... The decisions held
culpable were all responsibly made at a planning rather than operational level
and involved considerations more or less important to the practicability of the
Government's fertilizer program. Id. at 39-42.
Eastern Air Lines v. Union Trust Co., 221 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir.), aff'd, 350 U.S.
907 (1955). The Court of Appeals affirmed a lower court judgment against the
United States for the wrongful death of passengers on an Eastern Air Lines plane
which collided with another plane while both were attempting to land at an airport
owned and controlled by the Government. Negligence was attributed to a Civil Aero-
nautics Administration employee in the control tower for failure to keep the planes
advised of their respective positions. This was characterized as an "operational
level" activity. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, and affirmed per curiam.
o See Peck, The Federal Tort Claims Act-A Proposed Construction of the
Discretionary Functim Exception, 31 WASH. L. REV. 207 (1956). In discussing
the planning-operational level distinction shortly after the Supreme Court indicated
in Dalehite v. United States 346 U.S. 15 (1953), that it might adopt such a test, Pro-
fessor Peck states:
Not only would acceptance of such a classification involve all the difficulties
inherent in a formula for determining liability stated in terms only vaguely
definable, but it would also present a scheme for disposition of cases which
would have none of the appearance of justice. ... To phrase the test of liability
in terms which leave out its essential component would result in both confusion
and dissatisfaction. Id. at 219-20.
7243 F. Supp. at 827.
s American Exchange Bank v. United States, 257 F.2d 938 (7th Cir. 1958) ; Jemison
v. The Duplex, 163 F. Supp. 947 (S.D. Ala. 1958); Pierce v. United States, 142 F.
Supp. 721 (E.D. Tenn. 1955), af'd, 235 F.2d 466 (6th Cir. 1956).
0 243 F. Supp. at 826.
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Other cases, which the court in the principal case failed to adequately
consider, have held that an "affirmative decision to act or not to act"
takes place with the Government's initial determination to undertake
the project," i.e., the decision to dredge the channel. The Government
will be liable for any negligent decision in carrying out an initial deter-
mination to act, because these subsequent decisions are on the opera-
tional level. In Jemison v. The Duplex," the United States contracted
to dredge a ship canal. Because the government plans ignored the
dredging line of the canal, the water level fell below plaintiffs' wharves
and caused them to subside. Holding the Government liable, against
its contention that planning the dredging project was a discretionary
function, the court said:
Discretion within the meaning of the Tort Claims Act was exercised
when it was decided that the ship channel in the Mobile River should be
deepened. But in drawing the plans and specifications pursuant to
achieving this improvement, the United States Engineers were not
given carte blanche to draft plans and specifications for the dredging
operations in negligent disregard for the rights of property owners along
the shore. When acts of negligence are committed at the operational
level, the government is no longer immune from suit.12
The court in the principal case held that, even after the initial deci-
sion was made to dredge the canal, there was planning-level discretion
in how this was to be done. Although stating that "negligent perform-
ance of a course of action already decided upon"' 3 will be actionable
negligence, the court failed to explain why the decision to dump un-
covered spoil in a particular spot was not a negligent performance of
the decision to dredge the river.
The difficulty inherent in the planning-operational level dichotomy
lies in finding a point within the governmental decision-making hier-
archy at which liability for negligent decisions will attach. The opinion
in the principal case illustrates the general confusion which exists
because of a failure to analyze the many levels of decision-making that
occur once the legislative or executive branch has made a high-level
policy decision.'" Implementation of a broad policy requires many
10 See cases cited supra note 8.
"1163 F. Supp. 947 (S.D. Ala. 1958).
12 Id. at 951.
13 243 F. Supp. at 827.
14 Compare Bartholomae Corp. v. United States, 135 F. Supp. 651 (S.D. Calif. 1955)
(Government not liable for decision not to take preventive measures to protect
plaintiff's house from tests of atomic weapons), and Barroll v. United States, 135 F.
Supp. 441 (D. Md. 1955) (selection of weapon proving grounds at "planning level,"
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further decisions at lower levels of Government. Courts have generally
been satisfied to conclude that an allegedly negligent decision is either
on the "planning" or "operational" level, 5 rather than to look beyond
this question to a consideration of the role of the discretionary function
immunity within the general framework of the Federal Tort Claims
Act.
The purpose of the act has been concisely stated by the United States
Supreme Court:
Congress was aware that when losses caused by such [government] negli-
gence are charged against the public treasury they are in effect spread
among all those who contribute financially to the support of the Govern-
ment and the resulting burden on the taxpayer is relatively slight. But
when the entire burden falls on the injured party it may leave him
destitute or grievously harmed. Congress could, and apparently did,
decide that this would be unfair when the public as a whole benefits from
the services performed by Government employees.16
On the other hand, the specific purpose of the discretionary function
immunity is unclear. The legislative history is of little assistance."
Initially, the Supreme Court referred to the discretionary function
immunity as the distinction between "governmental" and "non-
governmental" functions.18 This analysis was later rejected as an
"inherently unsound" distinction," but the Court failed to offer a new
explanation. As previously mentioned, subsequent decisions-without
an adequate guideline-have been content to classify activity by the
Government as either "planning" or "operational,"2 without offering
an explanation for the classification.
Shortly after the planning-operational level dichotomy was con-
ceived, it was predicted that the distinction was no more precise than
and Government not liable for damage to plaintiff's house), with Bulloch v. United
States, 145 F. Supp. 824 (D. Utah 1956) (alternative holding) (Government liable
for injury to plaintiff's sheep from atomic fallout, as there is no justification for
negligent endangering of lives or property in the course of atomic tests). See
generally, Annot., 99 A.L.R.2d 1016 (1965).
15 See, e.g., United States v. Gregory, 300 F.2d 11 (10th Cir. 1962); Friday v.
United States, 239 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1957); Colorado Ins. Group, Inc. v. United
States, 216 F. Supp. 787 (D. Colo. 1963). For discussion of the possible factors un-
derlying the scant analysis by the courts, see Note, 66 HARv. L. REV. 488 (1953).
16 Rayonier, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 315, 320 (1957).
17 oSt of the examples given deal with the negligent operation of government mo-
tor vehicles. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 1400, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (1946). The reports on
earlier bills contain examples of activities clearly within the immunity, such as the
regulatory functions of the SEC and FTC. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 2245, 77th Cong.,
2d Sess. 10 (1942) ; S. REP. No. 1196, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1942).
Is Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 32 (1952).
19 Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 65 (1955).
20See cases cited supra note 15.
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was recognized between "governmental" and "proprietary" 21-a dis-
tinction rejected by the United States Supreme Court." Although an
examination of the cases applying the planning-operational level dis-
tinction supports the assertion that the test is far from precise, 2 Con-
gress intended in the Federal Tort Claims Act that the United States
be liable for negligent acts "under circumstances where the United
States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance
with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred. 2 4 A
literal reading of this provision would allow the judicial branch to
impose its judgment on another branch of Government whenever
negligence could be found. If the discretionary functions immunity is
viewed as a vehicle for the exercise of judicial restraint in "planning
level" decisions, courts will refuse to impose liability on the Govern-
ment when its conduct involves too many policy-level considerations
for the court to find fault.
In determining whether a particular governmental decision is subject
to judicial scrutiny, a court should determine if it is capable of judging
the utility and reasonableness of the Government's conduct. As the
application of any standard of negligence is a judicial weighing of the
wisdom of the actor's conduct against a risk of harm to others,2 it is
apparent that, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, the judiciary is
placed in a position of "second guessing" the wisdom of the Govern-
ment's conduct.2 The problem is further complicated by attempting
to apply tort principles of reasonableness to a unique organization-
the United States Government. There are many areas in which private
parties may not generally act, e.g., dredging navigable rivers. Although
most details of a given project are similar to acts performed by private
21 Peck, supra note 6, at 219.
22 Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 65 (1955). A recent case, Elgin
v. District of Columbia, 337 F.2d 152 (D.C. Cir. 1964), provides an excellent
discussion of the differences between the "discretionary-ministerial" and "govern-
mental-proprietary" tests at the municipal government level, the court adopting
the former.
23 See, e.g., cases cited supra note 14.
2428 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1964).
25 PRossER, TORTs §§ 31-34 (3d ed. 1964).
26 See Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Damage Actions, 77 HARv. L.
REv. 209, 235-39 (1963). Professor Jaffe argues, contrary to Professor Peck, that no
precise standards may be placed on the discretionary function immunity. "We must
... leave it to the courts to decide case by case whether they are competent to make
a more valid judgment than did the government." Id. at 238. See also 3 DAvis, AD-
mINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 25.13, at 491 (1958); JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF
AD MISTATIVE ACTION 256-60 (1965). But see, Parker, The King Does No Wrong-
Liability for Misadministration, 5 VAND. L. REv. 167, 172 (1952) : "The decision as to
what [is] a discretionary function... can never be reached with any degree of preci-
sion. The inevitably ensuing result will be uncertainty and arbitrariness of the law."
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parties, an attempt by a court to apply a "reasonable and prudent
government" standard to any actions above the performance level is
not possible in terms of traditional tort law, as no standards of com-
parison are available. Faced with these problems, the planning-opera-
tional level distinction may be valid and useful, as it allows federal
courts to determine their own ability to "second guess" the reason-
ableness and utility of a decision by a government official.
In the principal case, for example, the court may have concluded
that the decision to place uncovered spoil on the land involved too
many policy-level considerations for the court to declare the Govern-
ment's conduct unreasonable. But, as the court chose only to label this
as "planning" rather than "operational," the reasons underlying its
conclusion remain unclear. By the same token, the holding in Jemi-
son2 that the Government will be liable for any negligent decisions
beyond the initial decision to act, is too inflexible to merit approval."8
The hierarchical character of governmental decision-making requires
that a broad planning-level decision will inevitably set in motion many
other decisions, some of which may involve weighing alternatives which
courts are incapable of properly judging as reasonable or unreason-
able. Other decisions may be only at the operational level, involving
few variables of reasonableness and utility. Over the latter decisions,
Congress intended the courts to be the judge.
The planning-operational level distinction, if used as a device to
determine a court's own capability of judging negligence, will allow
the parties to argue on the basis of whether a certain decision is capable
of being found negligent by the court, rather than whether that decision
should be labelled "planning" or "operational." All parties concerned
benefit from a reasoned conclusion, rather than a conclusion alone.
7 163 F. Supp. 947 (S.D. Ala. 1958).
28 But sec Comment, 36 MARQ. L. REv. 88 (1952). After stating that the language
in 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1964) "seems to be clear and unequivocal," the writer suggests
that a distinction be drawn between a primary decision to undertake certain action
and subsequent decisions involved in the execution of the primary determination.
This would seem to ignore the governmental decision-making process, in which
Congress or the Executive makes a general decision to give a government official the
discretion to act, that official in turn delegating part of his discretion to a lower
official, and so-on down the line. Who makes the "primary decision"?
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